The Munich Agreement Was A Policy Of Appeasement

… The solution to the Czechoslovakian problem that has just been found is, in my opinion, only the prelude to a larger colony in which all Europe can find peace. This morning I had another meeting with the German Chancellor, Mr. Hitler, and this is the document that bears his name, as well as mine. Some of you may have already heard what it contains, but I`d just like to read it to you: ` … We consider the agreement signed last night and the Anglo-German naval agreement as a symbol of the desire of our two peoples never to go to war again. [96] “Chamberlain`s policy of appeasement bought a precious year for Britain to prepare for the war that was bound to come.” As Hitler`s previous appeasement had shown, France and Britain were anxious to avoid war. The French government did not want to go to Germany and took over the british Conservative government of Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain. He felt that the German dysfunctions of the Sudetenland were justified and that Hitler`s intentions were limited. Britain and France have therefore advised Czechoslovakia to meet Germany`s requirements. On 19 May, Benea began a partial mobilization in response to a possible German invasion. [14] Frank McDonough`s recent study examined British foreign policy and appeasement within British politics and society in the interwar period.

Its stated aim is to “show why politics has provoked such passion and opposition.” (McDonough 1998, 8) It assesses both the causes and effects of appeasement on British society. Andrew David Stedman`s 2011 book Alternative to Appeasement: Neville Chamberlain and Hitler`s Germany examines Chamberlain`s particular circumstances at the time of the agreement. It seeks a global synthesis to analyze the origins, nature and viability of the different alternatives to appeasement. (Stedman 2011, viii) This document contributes to the literature by briefly summarizing the reasons why appeasement was chosen as a response to the 1938 threat and its application to a threat today. The intelligence analyst (and hopefully the policy maker) should apply the lessons learned correctly. After examining the statements of the sponsors of the Munich Agreement and the analysis of scientists, immediately after the Second World War and more recently, several factors clearly appear as the main reasons for the appeasement of Germany in Munich and not as a harsh attitude of Great Britain and France. Two practical factors that influenced Neville Chamberlain were primarily the rejection of the notion of war and rearmament by British public opinion and the memory of the cost of the First World War in life and financial ruin.